Illinois State University

ISU ReD: Research and eData
Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15 (1985)

U.S. Supreme Court papers, Justice Blackmun

10-21-1985

10-21-1985 Correspondence from O'Connor to
Stevens
Sandra Day O'Connor
US Supreme Court Justice

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.library.illinoisstate.edu/delawarevfensterer
Part of the Criminal Law Commons
Recommended Citation
O'Connor, S.D. Correspondence from O'Connor to Stevens, Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15 (1985). Box 367, Harry A. Blackmun
Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

This Conference Note is brought to you for free and open access by the U.S. Supreme Court papers, Justice Blackmun at ISU ReD: Research and eData.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15 (1985) by an authorized administrator of ISU ReD: Research and eData. For
more information, please contact ISUReD@ilstu.edu.

GJou.ri gf lJt6 ~b ~talt.8'
:..ul{iqton. ~. OJ. 20~,.,

.tl1qn~nu

CHA .. et:A5 OF

vsr~cc:

SANORA OAY O'CONNOR

October 21, 1985

No. 85-214

Delaware v. Pensterer

Dear John,
You describe Agent Robillard's testimony as involving
"an implied prior representation of which the declarant
disclaims present knowledge,• on the grounds that his
qualification as an expert implied that "he had a valid
reason for reaching that conclusion at the time of his
investigation.• But the question reserved in Green involved
an express prior representation specifically introduced by
the prosecution as substantive evidence. I see nothing in
our cases that would justify embarking on the difficult and
questionable enterprise of deciding when there has been an
implied representation. In any event, in this case, Agent
Robillard openly admitted at voir dire that he could not
recall which reason was the basis for his conclusion. App.
to Brief in Opposition A-1-A-2. That admission would seem
to preclude finding any implied representation. Thus,
unless the Confrontation Clause required the trial court to
refuse to qualify Robillard as an expert witness because of
his lapse of memory, your analysis would not affect the
resolution of this case.
I think it clear that allowing Robillard to qualify as
an expert witness did not offend the Confrontation Clause.
The defense did not object to his qualification on these
grounds, instead urging that Robillard's adoption of the
follicular tag theory should disqualify him. App. to Brief
in Opposition A-8. Even if the defense had objected, I
continue to believe, for the reasons stated in the
circulating draft, that the Confrontation Clause does not
forbid the admission of an otherwise qualified expert's
opinion, arrived at through his ordinary testing processes,
solely because he is unable to recall which of the test
results was •positive.•
You also suggest that because this case would present a
situation analogous to Green had the prosecution introduced

Dr• DeForest's testimony as to Robillard's out-of-court
statement, we should not rely on this testimony to conclude
that the admission of Robillard's opinion did not deny
respondent a fair trial. I disagree. Given that the
admission of Robillard's opinion did not violate the
confrontation Clause, there is no basis for holding the
state responsible for the introduction of Dr. DeForest's
testimony, which defense counsel deliberately chose to
elicit. Even were we to assume that the state could somehow
be held responsible as a matter of due process, I would not
then leap back to the Confrontation Clause and reach the
Green question: I would ask whether the defendant might have
been denied a fair trial. In fact Dr. DeForest's testimony
accomplished precisely what the defense hoped--it put before
the jury the acknowledgment that Robillard said he could not
make, and heightened the usefulness to the defense of Dr.
DeForest's attack on the validity of the follicular tag
theory. It also tended to call into question the
truthfulness of Robillard's professed lapse of memory.
under these circumstances, it seems to me proper both to
suggest that due process may have a role to play in
situations to which the Confrontation Clause does not speak
and to explain why that possibility does not help
respondent's cause.
Sincerely,

Justice Stevens
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